Why do they vote for Le Pen? by Mayer, Nonna & Perrineau, Pascal
European Journal of Political Research 22: 12S141, 1992. 
0 1992 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 
Why do they vote for Le Pen?" 
NONNA MAYER & PASCAL PERRINEAU 
Centre d'ktude de la Vie Politique Francahe, Paris, France 
Abstract. The results of a survey conducted after the second round of the 1988 presidential election 
stress the inadequacy of the classical models of voting behaviour, as far as the Le Pen vote is 
concerned. The majority of lepenist electors identify themselves neither with the National Front, 
nor with the extreme-Right; they show no electoral stability, no strong sociological specificity. 
Less educated than the average, they do not correspond to the profile of the rational voter. With 
the exception of a small hardcore of regular voters, politicized, extremist and dedicated to the 
National Front, Le Pen supporters are protest voters that come and go. 
Introduction 
The most striking political change in the France of the 1980s has been the 
electoral rise of an extreme right-wing party, the National Front of Jean-Marie 
Le Pen. This party, born in 1972 from a federation of several small groups of 
the extreme-right, remained in political anonymity for ten years (Table 1). In 
the Presidential election of 1981, for example, its leader couldn't even run as 
candidate' and in the following parliamentary elections it won no more than 
0.2 percent of the votes. The picture changed after the left came to power. In 
1983, in a number of by-elections, the National Front made good progress, 
especially in Dreux where, on 4 September, the National Front list led by 
Jean-Pierre Stirbois won 16.7 percent of the valid votes. In the second round, 
the victory of a joint UDF-RPR-National Front list opened the doors of the 
town-hall to the extreme-right-wing councillors. This event can only be under- 
stood in the specific political context of the 1980s. 
The Mitterrand experiment had disappointed some of its supporters, show- 
ing the limits of alternative policies in the social and economic fields. This 
hopelessness brought about a lack of trust in the traditional parties of both 
right and left, from which the National Front profited. The latter also bene- 
fited from a neo-conservative ideological trend and a radicalization of the 
French right (Ysmal, 1984) which, stunned by its 1981 defeat, was in search of 
new political and ideological positions. The alliance between the moderate 
* This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the ECPR Workshop on the Extreme 
Right-wing Parties in Europe, held at  Bochum, in March 1990. 
124 
right and the extreme-right legitimized the National Front, liberated the vote 
in its favour and marked its political rebirth. It was the start of the ‘Le Pen 
phenomenon’. The European elections of 1984 gave the extremist party a 
national consecration. Since then, the FN has been steadily attracting some 10 
percent of voters, reaching a peak of more than 14 percent in the presidential 
election of 1988 (Mayer, Perrineau, 1989).* 
In order to understand why so many French electors vote for the National 
Front’s candidates we shall look at who they are. What makes them different 
from other voters? How specific and how diverse is the Lepenist electorate? 
Some answers to these questions are provided by data collected in a post- 
election survey, conducted by a research team from the Centre d’Ctude de la 
vie politique franqaise (CEVIPOF) after the second round of the Presidential 
election (May 9-20 1988), on a representative sample of 4032 French people of 
voting age.3 Compared to the actual voting figures for the Presidential first 
round, the data overestimate the score of Franqois Mitterrand (+ 6%), a 
classical bandwagon effect. As with most electoral surveys, they underesti- 
mate the score of Jean-Marie Le Pen (-4%). This bias can easily be ex- 
plained. Lepenist voters come more often than the average from poorly 
educated and working-class settings, where the proportion of citizens who 
don’t register, don’t vote, don’t open their door to survey interviewers, or 
refuse to answer to their questions, is a little higher than the average. And 
there is a halo of moral indignation and social reprobation around a vote for Le 
Pen that makes it more difficult to admit. This undersampling was not correct- 
ed by an overweighting of the declared Lepenist voters. This would have been 
to assume that the non-declared Lepenist voters had the same characteristics 
as the declared ones, thereby introducing a supplementary bias. 
Table 1. Votes for FN during the Fifth Republic (France as a whole) 
Year Elections Total valid % votes 
votes cast 
1973 
1974 
1978 
1981 
1984 
1986 
1988 
1988 
1989 
Legislative (first round)’ 
Presidential (first round) 
Legislative (first round) 
Legislative (first round) 
European 
Legislative 
Presidential (first round) 
Legislative (first round) 
European 
122 498 
190921 
82 743 
44414 
2 210 334 
2 705 336 
4 375 894 
2 359 528 
2 121 836 
0.5 
0.8 
0.3 
0.2 
11.0 
9.7 
14.4 
9.7 
11.8 
* In 1973, the Ministtre de I’Inttrieur did not discriminate between the various elements of the 
extreme-right. However, most of extreme-right candidates had been nominated by the FN. 
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The two major approaches of vote choice are the Michigan paradigm and 
the ‘rational choice’ model. According to the psycho-sociological model out- 
lined by the Survey Research Centre of Michigan (Campbell et al., 1960) 
electoral choice is linked to party identification, which creates a stable bond 
between the voter and the party he or she trusts and believes in. This identifica- 
tion is a permanent feature, determined by the voter’s family background, 
cultural milieu and socio-economic status. In the French context, electoral 
studies conducted by the CEVIPOF over a thirty year period have shown an 
association between voting behaviour, identification with the right or the left, 
and socio-cultural factors such as religion and social class (Michelat Simon, 
1977; Capdevielle et al., 1981; Cevipof, 1990). In the 1970s, the decline of party 
identification and the growing volatility of American electors challenged the 
Michigan paradigm, and alternative ‘rational choice’ models were developed. 
These stressed the importance of issues and candidates positions in the shaping 
of electoral behaviour (Nie, Verba, Petrocik, 1976; Pomper, 1975; Himmel- 
weit et al., 1984; Crewe, 1985). The elector was no more seen as ‘dependent’ 
but rather as ‘responsive’. Individualist, utilitarian and free from social, reli- 
gious or partisan ties, the voter was a ‘political shopper’, who bought parties as 
one buys other goods on the market, taking into account the stands of the 
different candidates on the different issues. And, while the previous model 
stressed the stability of party identification and votes, the rational choice 
model stressed change and choice among the most educated and politically 
sophisticated parts of the electorate. The same debate started in France in the 
1980s, in a context of rapid political change (Lavau, 1986; Habert Lancelot, 
1988, Cevipof, 1990). How much do the party identification and rational 
choice models explain of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s electoral success in 1988? 
The psycho-sociological model 
The key concept of the Michigan model is party identification. When asked to 
select, from a list of parties, the one they feel ‘the closest to or at least the least 
distant from’, the majority of French voters choose the party of their preferred 
candidate. This is true for two thirds of Chiraquists and Communists, more 
than half of Mitterrandists and Barrists, and 45 percent of the Greens (Table 
2). It reaches its lowest point among Jean-Marie Le Pen’s electors: only one 
third answer ‘The National Front’. Party-identification is not their primary 
voting motivation. 
The National Front has a short history, it could be that these voters identify 
themselves with the longstanding extreme right-wing ideological trend more 
than with Le Pen’s party. Asked to place themselves on a left-right scale with 
seven positions, only 15 percent of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s voters chose the 
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position of the far right. This proportion is five times more than for the sample 
on a whole (Table 2), yet the number of Lepenist voters who see themselves as 
right-wing extremists remains very small. 
In a multiparty system as France, identification with the right or the left, the 
old cleavage inherited from the Revolution of 1789, matters more than party 
identification. On a left-right scale with seven positions, the majority of the 
Lepenist voters classify themselves as Right-wing (positions 5 to 7 in Table 2). 
But they are more spread out on the scale than any other electorate. They are 
equally eclectic in their party choice, one out of five giving a left-wing party 
preference. The fact that the National Front is a recent party cannot explain 
this. The Ecologist Movement appeared on the French electoral scene at 
approximately the same time. Yet these electors are more coherent in their 
choices, identifying themselves mostly with the Greens or with the Left. 
Whatever the indicator we use, the political identification of the Lepenist 
voters seems more diverse than the average. 
A second element of the Michigan model is electoral stability. Two in- 
dicators allow us to measure this. First, there is a question in the CEVIPOF 
survey about the votes cast by electors since they have been of voting age. They 
Table 2. Political identification 
~ ~ 
1988 Presidential Green Left Barre Chirac Le Pen Total 
election (1st round) % % Yo % % Y O  
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Party proximity 
Left 
Green 
Center 
Right 
FN 
None, N A  
Left-Right Scale 
Extreme-Left (1) 
Left (2,3) 
Center (4) 
Right (5 .6)  
Extreme-Right (7) 
None, NA 
What counted in their choice 
- Personality of candidate 
- His proposal, his ideas 
- The parties supporting him 
- N . A .  
Total (N) 
39 
45 
3 
5 
0 
8 
3 
50 
34 
13 
0 
1 
11 
79 
6 
4 
(155) 
87 
2 
1 
2 
0 
9 
5 
73 
18 
2 
0 
1 
29 
61 
9 
2 
(1645) 
10 
2 
54 
23 
0 
12 
0 
5 
44 
48 
2 
1 
27 
62 
8 
3 
(496) 
4 
1 
14 
67 
1 
13 
0 
3 
23 
68 
4 
2 
26 
62 
10 
3 
(636) 
18 
2 
8 
23 
34 
14 
0 
12 
29 
43 
15 
1 
13 
79 
5 
4 
(357) 
47 
4 
11 
18 
4 
6 
3 
39 
28 
25 
3 
3 
24 
59 
8 
10 
(4032) 
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were asked whether they had ever voted for candidates of the following 
parties: Socialist, RPR or Gaullist, Communist, UDF or Centrist, National 
Front or Extreme-Right, Extreme-Left. A little more than a quarter of the 
sample said they had voted for candidates of three or more parties. Among 
Lepenist voters, the proportion reached a maximum of 59 percent. Of course, 
part of this mobility is structural; because the National Front is a new party, it 
must inevitably draw voters from other parties. Because it is still a small party, 
it cannot present candidates in every constituency in local elections and, in 
spite of its growing electoral strength, most often it cannot maintain its 
candidates in the second round. But the same could be said of supporters of the 
Green party, of extreme-left-wing formations, or of small groupings in the 
Center. Yet volatility among Lepenist voters is greater than among Green 
voters (25%), Barrists (34%) or left-extremists (41%). A second indicator of 
volatility is the vote choice of the Lepenist electors in the previous Parlia- 
mentary elections of 1986, in the second round of the 1988 Presidential elec- 
tion, and their voting intentions for the Parliamentary elections of the same 
year. Once more, Le Pen voters have a more mixed electoral profile than any 
other set of voters, including the Greens (Table 3a). It is not so much that they 
Table 3a. Voting patterns 19861988 
1988 Presidential Green Left Barre Chirac Le Pen Total 
election (1st round) % % % % % % 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
I986 Parl. election 
Didn’t vote 
Green 
Left 
Right 
FN 
1988 Pres. election 
(2nd round) 
Didn’t vote 
Mitterrand 
Chirac 
1988 Parl. election 
(voting intentions) 
Won’t vote 
Green 
Left 
Right 
FN 
Total (N) 
32 
17 
37 
14 
1 
12 
70 
18 
10 
29 
52 
8 
0 
(155) 
21 
1 
73 
5 
- 
3 
95 
2 
6 
89 
2 
2 
1 
(1645) 
21 
1 
6 
71 
1 
7 
14 
79 
10 
9 
2 
78 
1 
(496) 
19 
3 
78 
1 
- 
2 
4 
94 
10 
4 
1 
84 
1 
(636) 
21 
1 
16 
35 
28 
17 
27 
57 
9 
13 
1 
26 
51 
(357) 
29 
2 
37 
29 
3 
18 
49 
33 
15 
46 
5 
29 
6 
(4032) 
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switch from one party to another; so do the Greens. Thus, in the future 
Parliamentary elections only half of Lepenists and one third of Green voters 
intend to vote for the National Front or the Green candidate. What makes Le 
Pen voters different is that they cross the left-right divide more often than any 
other electorate. 
Daniel Boy has studied the electoral volatility of voters in the same four 
elections as above, reducing them to members of five political families, the 
extreme left (Communists and other extreme-left formations), the Greens, the 
Socialist left, the moderate right (UDF, RPR) and the extreme right (FN). He 
finds 281 electoral patterns, reduced to five broad classes (Table 3b). The 
‘stable abstentionnists’ never went to the polls. The ‘stable left’, including 
Greens, and the ‘stable right’ voted all four times for candidates of the same 
political family. These three groups account for two thirds of voters. The 
‘mobile left’ electors voted for another party of the Left, the ‘mobile right’ 
voters for another party of the Right.‘ The last group of ‘left-right mobile’ 
voters switched at least once from left to right or vice-versa. This group only 
represents 12 percent of the registered electors who could vote at all four 
elections. There are 32 percent of the group among Lepenist voters in 1988, 
more than in any other electorate. 
The Michigan model assumes a socio-cultural determinism of party-identifi- 
cation and vote. The Lepenist electorate does indeed show some specific social 
characteristics (Table 4). It is predominantly masculine, a little older and less 
educated than the average, living mostly in large towns, Catholic but not 
church-going. Yet the differences are not very sharp. If one measures the 
correlation between the different indicators listed in Table 4 and the propor- 
tion of Le Pen votes, it is never significant, varying between - 0.16 (educa- 
Table 3b. Voting patterns 198619823’ 
1988 Presidential Stable Stable Stable Mobile Mobile Left-Right Total 
election (1st round) Abst. Left Right Left Right Mobile 100% 
4 37 32 11 4 12 (N) 
Abstention 30 28 27 7 1 7 ( 567) 
Extreme Left 0 35 0 56 0 10 ( 342) 
Left 0 85 0 8 0 7 (1297) 
Green 0 30 0 45 0 25 ( 155) 
Right 0 0 85 0 1 14 (1129) 
Extreme Right 0 0 31 0 36 32 ( 357) 
Total (N) 4 37 32 11 4 12 (3847) 
* Parliamentary elections 1986, Presidential election 1988 (2 rounds), Parliamentary elections 
1988 (1st round, voting intentions), electors registered at the time of the four elections considered. 
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tional level) and 0.14 ( in~ome) .~  The so-called ‘sociological’ variables do not 
predictive the Lepenist vote. 
The main conclusion one can draw from Table 4 is that Jean-Marie Le Pen 
attracts voters from all groups of the population, old and young, rich and poor, 
Catholics and non-Catholics, rural and urban, upper and working class. This is 
a distinctive feature of the Le Pen vote. In 1988, religion and social class clearly 
differentiate traditional right-wing from left-wing or Green voters (Table 4). 
The right are more often self-employed, or owners of a business, shop or land. 
The majority are Catholic and church-goers. The left are more detached from 
religion and come more often from the working-classes. But Jean-Marie Le 
Pen voters stand somewhere in between (Table 4).6 They are better-off than 
Left-wing voters. They have higher incomes, they more often own their house 
or their business. They are more educated, with at least a technical degree. 
When they are blue-collars they more often are foremen or skilled workers, 
Table 4. Sociology of the presidential electorate 
1988 Presidential 
election (1st round) 
Green Left Barre Chirac Le Pen Total 
YO YO % YO YO YO 
loo 100 100 loo loo 100 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
18-40 years 
55 years & more 
CAP or less* 
Baccalaureate or more 
Size of town 
Rural area 
100.OOO or more 
Income, property 
More 7500 F monthly 
Own their house 
Own their business 
Shopkeepers 
Blue collars 
Church goers 
Non-Church goers, non-Catholics 
Age 
Education 
Occupation 
Religion 
Total (N) 
43 
57 
47 
53 
46 
54 
47 
53 
57 
43 
47 
53 
73 
12 
51 
30 
40 
36 
37 
43 
45 
32 
49 
32 
45 
33 
51 
27 
62 
19 
55 
25 
31 
45 
58 
24 
30 
32 
26 
36 
30 
34 
36 
31 
23 
45 
28 
36 
52 
31 
19 
51 
34 
13 
62 
48 
25 
51 
52 
32 
57 
39 
23 
51 
38 
19 
5 
17 
5 
30 
11 
13 
9 
13 
10 
29 
7 
24 
30 
70 
(357) 
24 
76 
(155) 
22 
78 
(1645) 
48 
52 
(496) 
52 
48 
(636) 
32 
68 
(4032) 
~~ ~~ ~~ 
* Lower technical degree. 
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though their rate of unemployment is not lower than average (8%). On the 
whole, they are not underprivileged electors. In the light of this socio-econom- 
ic profile, it seems excessive to qualify the Le Pen vote as merely ‘a desperation 
vote, where downwardly mobile categories or in a difficult position express 
their discontent’ (Jaffre, 1986). Rather, they have some cultural and economic 
resources, and socially they are upwardly mobile or stable more than down- 
wardly mobile.’ On the other hand, compared to moderate Right-wing elec- 
tors the Lepenist electorate is predominantly male and urban, younger, less 
educated, more detached from the Catholic Church and far more working- 
class. 
This hybrid character of Lepenist voters in 1988 is a consequence of their 
electoral mobility, reflecting their previous voting history. Voters for Le Pen 
come from both left and right, and their socio-economic profile reflects this. 
The rational choice model 
The rational choice model insists on the role of particular political factors in 
shaping electoral decisions, including the identity of the candidates and the 
salient issues of the campaign. French voters were asked what counted most 
for them when they voted (Table 2). Only 13 percent of the Lepenist voters, 
half as many as the average, answered that it was the ‘personality of their 
candidate’. The overwhelming majority of those who cast a vote in favour of 
Jean-Marie Le Pen declared they did not vote for the man, no more than for his 
party. What mattered, according to them, were ‘his proposals, his ideas’ (79% 
vs 59% in the sample) (Table 2). 
To explore the ideas of voters a battery of questions explored values and 
opinions in the fields of economics, sexuality, politics, religion and education. 
These were used to construct a set of synthetic attitudinal scales, described in 
Appendix 1. These scales were systematically related to voting behaviour and 
the results are reported in Table 5 .  
In spite of the National Front’s anti-abortion campaigns, and its support by 
Catholic fundamentalists, Table 5 shows that the Lepenists appear slightly 
more permissive in sexual matters - abortion, homosexuality, having a part- 
ner, unfaithfulness in married life - than the moderate right. 
Although the National Front is nationalist and in favour of law and order, on 
matters such as national pride, confidence in the Police, the Army, the 
Catholic Church, its voters are far less traditionalist than the electors of 
Raymond Barre or Jacques Chirac. 
In economic matters such as free enterprise, privatization and national- 
ization, the reestablishment of the tax on wealth (imp6t sur les grandes 
fortunes), Lepenist voters appear less liberal, far more in favour of state 
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interventionism than the Barrists or the Chiraquians. And they are a little 
more in favour than other right wing voters of socialism and social rights such 
as the right to go on strike, social security and unions. 
On all these issues, on which appear to be clear-cut left-right cleavages, the 
Lepenist voters stand in between left and right. Those who previously voted 
for the Left appear more in favour of state interventionism and social rights; 
those who voted for the Right favour more traditionalist and conformist 
positions.8 On only two issues do FN voters distinctly stand apart. These are 
immigration and law and order, the two dominant themes of the National 
Front campaigns. On the ethnocentrism scale, with questions about the num- 
ber of immigrants, the power of Jews, the rights of Muslims, the feeling that 
‘we are not at home any more’, half of the Lepenist voters have a score of 3 or 
more, many more than supporters of all the other parties. It is on the matter of 
immigration, however, that one finds the greatest differences. A total of 75 
percent of Jean-Marie Le Pen electors think there are too many immigrants (as 
opposed to 35 percent in the sample as a whole); 55 percent of FN supporters 
thoroughly disagree with the idea that Muslims living in France should have 
mosques to practice their religion (against 24 percent overall). On the author- 
itarianism scale with questions about the death penalty, the subordination of 
women, discipline at school, and the necessity for chiefs and hierarchy, Le Pen 
supporters have the highest scores (Table 5). The differences are particularly 
Table 5. Attitudes and values 
1988 Presidential Green Left Barre Chirac Le Pen Total 
election (1st round) YO YO YO YO YO YO 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Attitudinal scales* 
(“/o with high scores) 
Sexual permissivity 
Traditionalism 
Anti-interventionism 
Defense of social rights 
Pessimism 
Authoritarianism 
Ethnocentrism 
Interest in politics 
Support for democracy 
Total (N) 
37 
24 
12 
48 
45 
25 
11 
64 
68 
(155) 
28 
29 
3 
57 
51 
45 
16 
68 
72 
(1645) 
16 
53 
33 
21 
45 
60 
17 
69 
73 
(496) 
14 
57 
42 
19 
41 
72 
19 
66 
75 
(636) 
21 
40 
29 
23 
62 
76 
50 
62 
66 
(357) 
24 
38 
17 
38 
49 
55 
20 
63 
70 
(4032) 
* Were considered as ‘high scores’ 2 or more on the ‘Pessimism’, the ‘Interest in politics’ and the 
‘Democracy’ scales, 4 on the ‘Traditionalism’ Scale and 3 or more for all the other scales (see 
Appendix). 
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striking on the matter of capital punishment: 70 percent of the lepenist voters 
are ‘very much’ in favour of its reestablishment (against a sample average of 34 
percent). 
There has been a general rise in the number of people who hold these values 
in French society since the end of the 1970s (Mayer and Perrineau, 1989) but 
the rise seems to have been greater among National Front voters. These 
people are more likely to live in urban settings, where both the proportion of 
immigrants and crime rates are higher (Jaffre, 1984). Yet their rejection of 
immigrants and their call for law and order does not seem linked with a 
personal experience of insecurity, or with actual neighbourhood difficulties 
with ethnic communities. 
A survey conducted in Grenoble in 1986, dealing with the feeling of insecuri- 
ty, shows that Lepenist voters tend to overestimate insecurity in general but 
that ‘in the last three months’ they were less often than average the victims of a 
robbery, a theft, threats or violence. And analysis done by Perrineau in 
Grenoble, Rey in Seine Saint Denis, and Mayer in Paris shows that there is no 
relation between the electoral success of the National Front and the propor- 
tion of immigrants in the population (Lagrange and Roche, 1987; Perrineau, 
1985; Rey and Roy, 1986; Mayer and Perrineau, 249-267). Nonetheless more 
than other voters, FN supporters have a feeling of insecurity, even at home. 
They tend to exaggerate the number of agressions and robberies they or 
people they know have experienced. More than the others, they lock them- 
selves up at home before eight o’clock, and have spy holes and chains on their 
doors (Mayer and Perrineau, 1989; chap. 11). Whether they are imaginary or 
real the issues of immigration and insecurity, are very important electoral 
motivations of the Lepenists, in 1988, as well as in the previous elections. 
A third model, the protest vote 
The Le Pen voters obviously fit more into the ‘rational choice’ approach than 
in the Michigan model. They have a weak party identification to the National 
Front and split political attachments; they are electorally mobile; they cross 
the left-right divide; they have no specific religious or socio-professional 
identity; and they vote on specific issues. These are the characteristics of the 
‘political shopper’. Yet this mobility is not quite in line with a consumer- 
oriented model based on a new type of voter, young and educated. In our 
survey, however, the most mobile are the older voters and the less educated. 
The Lepenist voters prove more mobile whatever their age and level of 
education. The most mobile of all, with the exception of Green voters are 
those who combine old age and lack of education. These results are more in 
conformity with the classical concept of the ‘floating-vote’. In addition to this, 
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neither the rational choice or party identification approaches take into account 
the protest dimension of the Le Pen vote. A week before the first round of 
voting, when asked ‘in the bottom of their heart’ which candidate they wished 
to see elected President of the Republic, only 28 percent of the potential 
Lepenist voters answered ‘Jean-Marie Le Pen’; 26 percent preferred Jacques 
Chirac, 17 percent Franqois Mitterrand, 10 percent Raymond Barre. In con- 
trast, half of AndrC Lajoinie supporters, 81 percent of the Barrists, 84 percent 
of the Chiraquist supporters, and 91 percent of the Mitterrandist potential 
voters wished the victory of their own m and id ate.^ Today more than 40 percent 
of the people who share Jean-Marie Le Pen’s ideas about immigration think he 
has ‘no solution to the problem’; only 36 percent of those who feel close to the 
National Front consider it ‘capable of governing France’. lo Even those who 
declare themselves ‘very close’ to the National Front see the Le Pen vote 
mostly as a protest against the political system (Table 6). 
This protest is linked to the political upheavals of the 1980s, the Socialist 
victory in 1981 after twenty three years of right-wing domination, the Socialist 
defeat in the 1986 Parliamentary elections, two years of subsequent ‘cohab- 
itation’ between a left-wing President and a right-wing Prime Minister, the 
reelection of Franqois Mitterrand in 1988 and the absence of a clear majority in 
the following parliamentary elections. These rapid changes have blurred the 
left-right division, brought about disappointments and resentments, worn out 
the parties of government and helped the electoral rise of a protest party such 
as the National Front among the least politically and socially integrated 
segments of the electorate. 
Thus the Lepenist voters seem to have less confidence in the social and 
political process than others. Indeed, they are the less confident in all of the 
main institutions: justice, education, television, religion, parliament and ad- 
ministration. With the exception of the police and the army, they are less 
Table 6.  A protest vote: ‘Do you think that people who vote for a candidate or a list of the National 
Front do so rather.. . 
Total electorate Close to FN Very close to FN 
1 00 O/O 100% 100% 
To protest against today’s political 
system 59 67 52 
Because they trust the ideas 
supported by Jean-Marie Le Pen 34 27 41 
N.A. 7 6 7 
IFOP-Journal du Dimanche, 26th September - 7th October 1988, national sample 
representative of French people of voting (1949 interviews), Le Journal du Dimanche, 14 
October 1988. 
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favourable towards any kind of associative life, and less prone to any form of 
collective action (such as demonstrations, strikes, occupations) to defend their 
interests. This distrust goes with a general feeling of uncertainty a fear of the 
future (Table 5). On a scale of pessimism, based upon questions about the way 
democracy functions in France, the feeling that people like them were ‘better 
off before’, that with what they earn ‘it is impossible to lead a normal life’, they 
have the largest proportion of high scores, along with the Communists. Also 
with the Communists, they are the most willing to agree that ‘When I think 
about the future, often I feel afraid’. And the more pessimistic, the more 
ethnocentric, and the more in favour of law and order, the more receptive they 
are to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s ideas. 
Overall, the Lepenist vote of 1988 appears not to be a vote for the National 
Front, nor a vote for its leader, nor a vote for the extreme-right. It is more a 
vote ‘against’ things; against immigrants and delinquents who are but the 
scapegoats of their fears, against the political establishment and the parties of 
government. It is a protest vote, an ‘exutory’ vote as Jer8me Jaffre calls it, 
more expressive of resentment than instrumental. l1 Paradoxically the National 
Front plays the same part in the French political system as the Communist 
Party did yesterday. It too had a fringe of protest voters who did not believe in 
Communist values but saw in the party a defender of the little people and ‘a 
party of the discontents’. Georges Lavau called this the ‘tribunitian function’ 
of the Communist Party, acting rather like the Tribune of the Plebs in ancient 
Rome (Lavau, 1969). At the other extremity of the political board, the 
National Front appears to be doing the same thing.12 
Conclusion: the regular, the occasional, the potential Lepenist voters 
True believers and others 
The main cleavage among Jean-Marie Le Pen voters in 1988 is closely linked to 
the protest dimension of their vote (Table 7). The regular voters, those who 
voted for the National Front in 1986 and for Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1988, form a 
politicized, partisan and extremist hardcore representing some two percent of 
the French voting age population. That is approximately the electoral level of 
the extreme-right wing in France, at low tide. These people are in sharp 
contrast to the newcomers who voted Le Pen in 1988 but not in 1986. They are 
older, predominantly male, more educated, with more often a secondary 
school qualification or even a higher-education degree. They also have more 
income and property. While the new Lepenist voters are mostly Catholic non 
church-goers, regular supporters are more often regular church-goers or, on 
the contrary, atheists. This contrast is evocative of the cleavage, among the 
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National Front, between fundamentalist Catholics and the pagan New Right. 
They are far more interested in politics. They show a strong party-identifica- 
tion to the National Front (74 as opposed to 19 percent). They position 
themselves five times more often at the extreme right of the left-right scale. A 
total of 47 percent of them admit that since they are of voting age they have 
‘often’ voted for extreme-right wing or National Front candidates (7 percent of 
newcomers say this). 
Table 7. Regular and occasional Le Pen votersa 
Vote FN 1986 (Parliament) Regular Occasional 
Vote Le Pen in 1988 (President) (1986+ 1988) (1988 only) 
100% 100% 
Sociology 
Men 
Age 45 or more 
Towns 100,OOO or more 
Income 7500 F or more 
Own their business 
Shares in privatized companies 
Regular church goers 
Atheists 
Pessimistic 
Authoritarian 
Ethnocentric 
High interest in politics 
Political identification 
FN’s closest Party 
Extreme-right position on Scale 
Attitudes and valuesb 
Votes 
1988 Presidential election (2nd round) 
Didn’t vote 
Mitterrand 
Chirac 
(voting intentions) 
Won’t vote 
Left, Green 
Right 
FN 
1988 Parliamentary election 
Total (N)  
61 
55 
54 
64 
29 
27 
18 
14 
18 
82 
61 
41 
74 
37 
28 
16 
56 
2 
2 
3 
93 
(99) 
54 
46 
42 
55 
20 
17 
12 
6 
11 
73 
46 
22 
19 
I 
12 
31 
51 
12 
19 
34 
35 
(258) 
“The group who voted FN in 1986, and did not vote Le Pen in 1988 is too small to appear in the 
table. 
hScored 2 or more on ‘Pessimism’ and ‘Interest in politics’ scales, 3 or more in the others 
(Appendix 1). 
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In terms of future intentions, 93 percent of regular supporters are ready to 
vote FN again in Parliamentary elections (versus 35 percent of others). As 
shown by their high level of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, regular 
supporters are the most receptive to the ideas of Jean-Marie Le Pen. They are 
true ‘believers’ in the sense of the Michigan model (Table 7).13 Every election 
adds ephemeral new voters to this stable core. One third of the 1984 National 
Front voters who went to the polls in 1986 didn’t reiterate their vote. And if the 
1986 voters were more faithful (90 percent of them voted for Jean-Marie Le 
Pen in 1988) they were not for long. After the Presidential election was over 
only half of the 1988 Lepenist voters considered voting for National Front 
candidates in the subsequent Parliamentary elections, a proportion that drop- 
ped to one third among the newcomers (Table 7). 
These successive waves of National Front voters have different character- 
istics and different motivations. According to the same exitpolls, the National 
Front electors of 1984, unfaithful in 1986, were predominantly bourgeois, 
educated, Catholic church-goers and Right-wing. In the second round of the 
Presidential election of 1981,75 percent of them had voted for ValCry Giscard 
d’Estaing. They switched to the National Front in protest against the ‘socialo- 
communist’ victory. The European elections were the ideal opportunity to 
vent their discontent. But, in the decisive parliamentary elections of 1986 most 
switched from an expressive to an instrumental vote in favour of the traditional 
right, and 88 percent of them voted for RPR - UDF candidates. 
Compared to the 1984 voters, those who rallied the National Front in 1986 
were younger, socially and politically less integrated. They included twice as 
many blue collar workers and three times more unemployed. On May 10,1981, 
one third voted for Franqois Mitterrand and another third did not vote. Their 
support for the National Front expressed their disappointment with the Social- 
ist government, which had not kept its promises. 
Those who joined Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1988 were a more diversified lot, 
more right-wing and petit-bourgeois. They were more critical than all of the 
other voters of the period of ‘cohabitation’ between a left-wing President and a 
right-wing Prime Minister. In the second round of the Presidential election 
they went back to the parties they had come from. Of the formerly left-wing 
FN voters, 76 percent supported Franqois Mitterrand in the second round and 
of the formerly Right-wing FN voters, 87 percent supported Jacques Chirac. In 
the subsequent Parliamentary elections, 53 percent of FN supporters with a 
left-wing voting history declared they would vote for the candidates of the left, 
and 58 percent of those with a right-wing voting history that they would vote 
for candidates of the traditional right. 
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Regular, occasional and potential voters 
There is a large pool of potential of voters for Jean-Marie Le Pen and his party 
in the French electorate. When asked: ‘Among the following parties, can you 
tell me any for which you wouldn’t vote in any circumstance?’, 65 percent of 
the sample excluded voting for the National Front, a figure confirmed by 
recent polls.14 This means that one third of the electorate does not rule out the 
possibility of such a vote. If one excludes those who have already voted for the 
National Front or its President (1986 or 1988), one can get a clear image of who 
these potential voters are (Table 8). The majority of those who rule out voting 
for the National Front declare left-wing choices and affinities, and come more 
often from the upper class or the salaried middle class. Among executives, 
professionals and teachers who voted for the left in the first round of the 
Presidential election, the proportion of those who exclude voting FN amounts 
to more than 95 percent. 
Those who do not explicitly exclude voting for the National Front are more 
often working-class or lower middle class electors. They are less educated and 
less interested in politics, declare a party proximity less frequently, are more 
abstentionist. When they declare a party proximity, and when they vote, it is 
more often in favour of the RPR. Among the unskilled workers who didn’t go 
to the polls in the first round of the Presidential election or voted for Jacques 
Chirac, the potential National Front voters are the majority. Compared to 
those who have already voted for the National Front, the potential FN electo- 
rate is more feminine, more rural, more observant of the Catholic religion. On 
the other it is more proletarian, with less property and less education. The 
party of Jean-Marie Le Pen can still draw voters from the underdogs, the least 
politically and socially integrated, as well as from the well-off conservative 
right. 
Yet, until now, Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front have not succeed- 
ed in aggregating, in the same election, the different elements of their poten- 
tial electorate. The faithful extremist hard core, the disappointed voters of the 
classical right, and the social protest voters have never yet come together in the 
same electoral gathering. Handicapped by its extremist position, and by its 
lack of governmental and presidential credibility, the National Front and its 
leader have remained in a protest role and do not appear as a positive political 
a1ternati~e.l~ The National Front presented its 8th Congress in Nice (30th 
March - 1st April 1990) as the Congress of the ‘March to power’. For the 
moment, however, it is far from having the electoral means to realise its 
political ambitions. 
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Table 8. Voters, non-voters and potential voters for the National Front" 
FN Vote Voters Non-voters Potential voters 
100% 100% 100% 
Sociologyb 
Women 43 52 58 
Rural area 31 33 40 
CAP or less 62 50 67 
2 or more elem. property 50 50 41 
Church goers 29 29 38 
Pessimistic 63 45 53 
Authoritarian 74 45 73 
Ethnocentric 49 12 31 
Interest in politics 27 36 21 
Attitudes and values' 
Party proximity 
Left, Green 21 64 31 
UDF 8 11 11 
RPR 22 14 26 
FN 34 0 2 
None, N.A. 15 11 30 
Left-right scale 
Extreme-Left (1) 0 3 2 
Left (2, 3) 11 50 22 
Right (5.6) 41 18 35 
Extreme-Right (7) 16 1 2 
Center (4) 30 21 31 
N.A. 1 2 8 
1988 Presidential vote 
Lajoinie, Extreme-Left 12 4 
Mitterrand 41 23 
Waechter 5 2 
Barre 13 1s 
Chirac 14 26 
Didn't vote 16 30 
Total (N) (380) (2591) (1061) 
a Voters = Vote FN in 1986 or Le Pen in 1988. Non-Voters = have not voted FN or Le Pen and 
exclude voting for the National Front. Potential voters = have not voted FN or Le Pen but do not 
exclude voting for the National Front. 
CAP: Lower technical degree. Elements of property: transferable securities, stocks bonds, real 
estate (property of house or business not included). 
cNotes 2 or more on 'Pessimism' Scales, 3 or more on the others (Appendix 1). 
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Appendix: attitudinal scales 
These attitudinal scales are hierarchical scales constructed according to the Loevinger method. 
For each scale, we list the questions on which the scale is based and the value of the homogeneity 
Loevinger coefficient (in brackets). For a more detailed account see CEVIPOF (1990), L’tlecfeur 
francais en quesfions, pp. 229-236. 
Anti-interventionism (0.48) 
‘Privatizations’: ‘Very positive’ (117’0) 
‘The Tax on wealth should be reestablished’: ‘Rather’ or ‘Strongly disagrees’ (20%) 
‘Nationalizations’: ‘Very’ or ‘Rather negative’ (43%) 
‘To face economic difficulties the State should trust companies and give them more freedom’: 
(60%) 
‘Socialism’: ‘Very positive’ (150/,) 
‘If one abolished Unions’: ‘Very serious’ (500/,) 
‘If one abolished the right to strike’: ‘Very serious’ (51%) 
‘If one abolished Social Security’: ‘Very serious’ (88%) 
‘To be unfaithful to ones wife or husband’: ‘Morally not wrong at all’ (17%) 
‘Homosexuality’: ‘Morally not wrong at all’ (28%) 
‘Abortion’: ‘Morally not wrong at all’ (39%) 
‘Living together without being married’: ‘Morally not wrong at all’ (67%) 
‘The Church’: ‘Rather trust’ (56%) 
‘The Army’: ‘Rather trust’ (62%) 
‘The police’: ‘Rather trust’ (74%) 
‘I am proud to be French’: ‘Rather’ or ‘Strongly agrees’ (89%) 
‘In a society one needs a hierarchy and leaders’: ‘Strongly disagrees’ (5%) 
‘The death penalty should be reestablished: Strongly disagrees’ (24%) 
‘School should primary develop a sense of discipline and effort’: (39%) 
‘Women are essentially made to bear children and bring them up’: ‘Rather agrees’, ‘Rather’ or 
‘Strongly disagrees’ (89%) 
‘Today democracy in France works. . .’: ‘Not well at all’ (9%) 
‘The daily life of people like you is’: ‘Worse than before’ (49%) 
‘The money one brings home is not enough to live decently’: ‘Strongly’ or ‘Rather agrees’, 
‘Rather disagrees’, or does not answer (goo/,) 
‘Jews have too much power in France’: ‘Strongly agrees’ (9%) 
‘It would be normal if Muslims living in France had mosques to practice their religion’: ‘Strongly 
disagrees’ (24%) 
‘Nowadays one does not feel at home as much as before’: ‘Strongly’ or ‘Rather agrees’ (49%) 
‘There are too many immigrants in France’: ‘Strongly’ or ‘Rather agrees’, does not answer 
Defense of social rights (0.50) 
Sexual permissivity (0.61) 
Traditionalism (0.44) 
Anti-Authoritarianism (0.49) 
Pessimism (0.48) 
Ethnocentrism (0.54) 
(71%) 
Interest in politics (0.47) 
‘Are you interested in politics?’: ‘Very’ (10%) 
‘Very’ or ‘Rather close of one political party in particular’: (42%) 
‘Recently have you followed political programs on television or on the radio?’: 
Very’ or ‘Rather often’ (59%) 
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‘Some people say of politics that it is too complicated and that one has to be an expert to 
understand it’: ‘Strongly’ or ‘Rather disagrees’, ‘Rather agrees’ (80%) 
‘Today democracy in France works.. .’: ‘Very well’ (8%) 
‘If one abolished political parties’: ‘Very serious’ (39%) 
‘If one abolished the National Assembly’: ‘Very serious’ (66%) 
‘If one abolished the right to vote’: ‘Very serious’ (89Y0) 
Support for democracy (0.66) 
Notes 
1. Failing to get the 500 signatures of elected representatives required. 
2. On the electoral history of the National Front see Mayer and Perrineau, 1989: Chap. 2. If 
there were parliamentary elections today, the National Front would draw 15% of the votes 
(BVA-Paris-Match survey, 4th-7th and 15-20th November 1991; national representative 
sample of 3632 French people of voting age). 
3. 4032 interviews. See CEVIPOF, 1990. 
4. For instance a Green elector voting for the Socialists, the Communists or the extreme-left 
candidates, a National Front voter voting for the RPR or the UDF candidate. 
5 .  With the gamma statistic that varies between 1 (perfect association, all the cases are in the 
diagonal) and 0 (none, all the cases are out of the diagonal). See CEVIPOF, 1990, chap. 8, 
Table 1. 
6. There is by now considerable data on the sociological profile of the Lepenist voters (See 
Mayer and Perrineau, 1990: 61 & 266-267). Unfortunately it often comes from exit-polls 
which show specific biases. Because the polling stations must have a minimum number of 
registered voters the smaller rural polling stations are excluded from the sample and the 
farmers are underweighted. Because the interview form is self-administered it discourages 
elder people which are also underweighted. The self-declared occupations are very approxi- 
mately defined. Our data, based upon a long post-electoral survey, administered at home by 
trained interviewers, is all together more detailed and more reliable. 
7. If one takes into account the father’s occupation of the small shopkeepers who vote for 
Jean-Marie Le Pen, compared to all shopkeepers, they are more often working-class or lower 
middle class (36% were workers vs 27%, 39% owned a small business or a farm vs 42%) than 
upper or middle class (14% vs 21%). And among the workers voting for Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
52% of the fathers were working-class (vs %YO), 22% small business or farm owners (vs 19%) 
and 10% upper or middle class (vs 13%). 
8. 81% of the 1988 Lepenist voters who voted for the moderate Right in 1986 have a high score on 
the ‘Authoritarianism’ scale versus 71% of those who voted for the Left; 58% have a high 
score on the ‘Traditionalism’ scale versus 27% ; 22% have a high score on the ‘Social Rights’ 
scale versus 38%; 46% have a high score on the ‘Sexual permissivity’ scale versus 36%; and 
75% have a highs core on the ‘Anti-interventionism’ scale versus 34%. 
9. Survey conducted by the SOFRES for a group of local newspapers, 1st-2nd April 1988. See 
Jaffrt, 1988. 
10. SOFRES-Le Figaro survey, 10-14th March 1990, quota sample of lo00 French people of 
voting age. (Le Fignro, 28th March 1990). 
11. By many aspects the electors of the National Front are typical of the ‘men of resentment’ 
described by Max Scheler at the beginning of the century (Scheler, 1970; Taguieff, 1990). 
12. That does not mean that the Communist voters turn to the National Front. See Mayer and 
Perrineau, 1989: chap. 13. 
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13. The electors who voted for the National Front in 1984 and in 1986, compared to the 
newcomers of 1986, presented exactly the same characteristics than the 1986-1988 regular 
voters according to the exit polls conducted by BULL-BVA for RMC, Libkration, Antenne 2 
and Paris-Match, March 16th 1986, on a sample of 4564 voters and for Antenne 2, Europe 1, 
Paris-Match, April 24th 1988, on a sample of 2837 voters. See Mayer and Perrineau, 1989: 
261-263. 
14. 64% according to the SOFRES-Le Figaro survey (1&14 March 1990) already quoted. 
15. In a SOFRES poll of March 1990,8l% of the people questioned considered that the FN was a 
racist party (against 9% who declared that it was not), 78% that it was sectarian (8Yo tolerant), 
and 72% a danger for democracy (16% not dangerous). 
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